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IN THE. SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

RALPH HADLEY, a Minor
By REX HADLEY, his guardian Ad
Litem,
PaintiJff and Appellamt,

No. 9007

vs.
DOUGLAS J. WOOD,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant's Statement of Facts is not complete,
and we therefore prefer to incorporate our own summary.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This law suit arose out of an accident between the
defendant's automobile and a sle]gh being ridden by
the plaintiff minor, which occurred on Sunday afternoon, January 9, 1955, on Polk avenue in Ogden, Utah,
about 3 o'clock PM.
On the day of the accident, the street was snow
packed, and icy (T-11, 22, 35) the weather was cold (T11, 18).
Polk Avenue runs North and South and is about
35 feet wide ('T-9, 19). On the day of the accident there
were snow banks on both sides of the street approximately three feet high (T-13, 71) which narrowed the
travel portion of the road to about 25 feet (T-11, 19).
Polk Avenue, at the scene, is level (T-18) and straight
(T-17). Residences are located on the West side of the
street aiJ.d located to the east of Polk avenue is the
Wasatch School on the top of a rise, which starts just
east of the sidewalk (T-9, 10). From the base of the rise
to the east edge of the street, the ground is level (T-20,
21). The width of the level area was estimated at about
20 to 25 feet (T-175). On the day of the accident therefore, the top of the snow bank was about 3 feet above
the level area east of the east curb. and the investigating
officer confirmed the defendant's testimony that the
bank would block a motorist's vision of a child lying
on a sleigh in the flat area east of the street (T-22). ,
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There was no traffic as the defendant drove his car
south on Polk A venue. His speed was ten to twelve miles
per hour (T-169, 15, 25). As the defendant entered the
block where the school is located, he saw two or three
children standing on the hill ( T -181) and about mid
way up the hill. When he saw the children, none of them
were sleigh riding (T-192). The defendant could not
say, and there was no evidence, that plaintiff, Ralph
Hadley, was one of those children. Defendant first saw
the plaintiff lying prone on the sleigh as it emerged
through a slight cut out in the east snow bank, (TR 20,
197) going west "pretty fast," directly into the path of
the south bound car (T-170, 184). At that time, the
distance that separated the sleigh and the car was 10
to 15 feet (T-184, 15). The defendant immediately
swerved his car into the west snow bank where the car
stopped with the front end in the bank "a couple of
feet" (T-174). The rear wheels were still on the icy
travel portion of the road (Diagran1). The point where
young Hadley's sleigh had entered the street was the
only point where the children had "cut through" the
snow bank (TR 20).

The def.endant felt no impact with the sleigh (T-171)
and felt that the accident had been averted. However,
when he got out of his car, he found the boy under
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the ear, pinned between the transmission housing and
the snow bank (T -173). The sleigh was not dmnaged
(T-127).
The unanimous verdict of the jury was in favor of
the defendant, no cause for action (T-209).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
The Respondent respectfully submits two points:
POINT I
THE VERDICT IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.

POINT II
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO 'THE JURY WERE
NOT ERRONEOUS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE VERDICT IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.

It is clear that the question of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff minor is not an issue· in this
case. Appellant's reference to that subject, in the opening paragraph of his Statement of Facts, and in Point
1 of his Argument, is particularly curious, in light with
the fact that defendant's requested instruction Number
11, on the child's contributory negligence, was denied
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by the Court, and the jury was instructed 1n very
definite language, as follows:
No. 14.

Even if it should appear to you from the
evidence in this case that the parents of plaintiff
were negligent in the manner in which they exercised, or failed to exercise, their parental duties
for his care, .such negligence, if any, may not be
imputed to the plaintiff and shall not constitute
a bar to recovery by him, if otherwise he is entitled to recover.
Likewise the negligence, if any, of any child
dealing with the plaintiff would not be a defense
if the defendant is otherwise liable.
In some cases you rnay have heard of the
defense of "contributory negligence," "contributory negligence'' as a defense is based on public
policy that does not permit the Courts to be used
by one wrong doer to recover from another, and
that is not for the public good that one guilty
himself to sue another; such a public policy encourages careful conduct by all.
This policy has no application in case where
a child about six years and one month old brings
a suit under circumstances as presented in this
case. The law conclusively concludes that the
child is incapable of the judgn1ent and attentiveness necessary to bring his own misconduct to the
magnitude that would justify an adult otherwise
liable in successfully asserting contributory negligence as a defense.
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It must be remembered however that regardless of the tender years of a child, no person is
liable to a child unless the adult has been negligent as the term is here defined, and that
negligence was approximate cause of the child's
injury.
Plaintiff's contentions here, therefore, are limited
to one proposition, and that is the contention that the
defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law,
which proximately caused the accident and injuries to
the plaintiff minor.

Plaintiff made no motion at the close of all the
evidence, that a verdict be directed in his favor. The
defendant made a Motion for a dismissal of the action,
at the close of the Plaintiff's case, and later, a directed
verdict at the close of all the evidence, both of which
were denied.

The Honorable Court at T-156, stated:
"I believe there are questions of fact raised
because of those two matters that can be submitted to the jury. That is, the first upon the
testimony of driving too fast under the circumstances, circumstances of the nature coming from
the Major's (Riblett) testimony and the circumstances, and also, circumstantial evidence as to
failure to keep proper lookout."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
The testin1ony of Major Riblett, plaintiff's witness,
and ·"the circumstantial evidence" concerning defendant's lookout were indeed shaky foundations upon which
plaintiff's case rested. We gladly look at the evidence,
but not as digested in Appellant's Brief.
"Plaintiff's brief relates facts which most
strongly support their own contentions. However,
on appeal, we must take the opposite approach
and consider those facts that most strongly support the verdict, where there is evidence pointing
in different directions" Morley vs Rodberg, 7
Utah 2nd, 299, 323 Pac. 2nd, 717.
As indicated by the trial Judge, the only possible
evidence concerning a speed of defendant's car at more
than 10 to 12 miles per hour, was given by Major Riblett. But his testimony, digested, was:
1. He did not see the accident and did not see the
defendant's car as it traveled the entire length of the
block to the point of ilnpact ( T -40).

2. He had seen a car pass hiln on 32nd street,
going west, at a speed he estilnated at 25 miles per
hour (T-38), and saw that car turn left on to Polk
A venue. (Defendant testified he had previously approaehed Polk Avenue, going East and had turned right
on to Polk Avenue (TR 168).)
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3. The witness followed the car ahead, at about
75 to 100 yards until it followed a curve and went out
of sight. The witness described the car as a light tan
or dirty yellow colored, two door ( T -51).

(Defendant's car was a green convertible, with a
black top, rather faded) (T-168, 200).

4. He lost sight of the car only "momentarily"
(T-51) and when he came in view of the street, he saw
the defendant's car one half block away, nosed into the
snow bank at a 45 degree angle. When the witness
stopped, the defendant was under the car attempting
to help the boy (T-39, 52, 56). He had not seen l\1r. Wood
either go to or return from a nearby house (T-56).
(The defendant, immediately after the accident, ran
to a house, knocked on the door, told the people to call
an ambulance, and returned to the car and crawled
under to help the boy (T-172). This was verified by
plaintiff's witnesses Sessions (T-69) and Mrs. Sessions
(T-76, 77) and obviously consumed more time than
"momentarily," and yet the Major testified at (TR 56):

"It was a mystery to me how he got under
that car so fast."
The jury was justified in concluding that the wit-
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ness was the victim of faulty association of the car he
followed and the defendant's car, which could not have
been the same vehicle at all.
The physical facts, further, clearly disproved the
Major's testimony concerning the alleged speed of 25
miles per hour.
Plaintiff's witness, Officer Rose, testified:
Tr-12.
"The snow bank where the car went through
was fairly soft."
Tr-22.

Q. "So that it would not have had too great
a slowing action upon an automobile plowing
through it1
A.

"Not too great, no.

Tr-25.

Q. "Now in your investigation, did you find
anything to disprove Mr. Wood's statement to
you that he was travelling about 10 to 12 miles
per hour~
A. "No, I didn't.
Tr-22.

Q. Now how far did you detern1ine that the
car had travelled after iinpact with this boy~
A. I could not determine just exactly where
the impact was with the boy. I couldn't tell you
how far it travelled.

Q. Now isn't it correct that on your report
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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you put three

feet~

A. That would be the distance it would be
able to travel after i1npact, was the statement I
received from the driver. Approximately that.
That is what it was.

Q. Now did you measure the distance from
a line directly across ... from where the children
had apparently been sleighing, from that imaginary line down to the point where the car had
stopped~

A. No, I did not measure that.
Q. But it wasn't very far, was
A.

it~

No.

Plaintiff's own expert, Professor Karl Koerner of
the Mechanical Engineering Department of the U niversity of Utah, testified that a car, under icy road conditions, at 20 miles per hour would require 180 feet
to stop, including reaction time of llh seconds ( Tr 107).
Presumably 60 feet of that distance would be travelled
during the reaction time, or a total sliding distance of
120 feet. There was not one iota of evidence to contradict the defendant's testimony that immediately upon
seeing the child, about 15 feet distant, he swerved into
the snow bank, and applied his brakes, and yet the rear
of the car did not whip around; the car stopped only
partly into the soft snow bank, with the rear wheels
still on the icy surface; and the car stopped from three
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feet to "less than a car length" south of the point where
the sleigh had entered the street, facts which wuold b~;
physically impossible had the car been travelling 20 to
25 miles per hour.

Test, then, the defendant's testimony with the physical facts. This Honorable Court has repeatedly used a
reaction time of three-fourths of a second, in testing
testimony, the most recent case, we believe to be
Richards vs Anderson, Case No. 8970. Plaintiff's own
expert believes that to be unrealistic.
Tr-112.
"I believe that (tests) seem to bear out ...
in those ideal conditions, the reaction time is
roughly three-quarters of a second. However, I
think the formula is a little bit more complicated
than that and most designers are using two and
a half to three seconds reaction time for new
highway work and it is based on the fact that
there is personality involved, the time of the day
when you go to work, your people's feelings, and
the fact that there is no warning in a case of an
automobile situation and a person has to evaluate
the ·complexity and then make his decision, so
this jumps the reaction time up a little bit and
I thought that one and a half is more realistic
really than three-quarters."
But the Professor does agree that a "simple" reaction of swerving might well be accomplished in threeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fourth's second, while the "complex'' reaction of removing the foot from the accelerator to the brake would take
materially longer. (Tr-115-116)

Using the three fourths second test, at 10 to 12 miles
per hour, the distance would be 11 to 13 feet travelled
before the swerve started, and according to the officer,
as well as the defendant, the car stopped immediately,
the stopping being caused obviously by the snow bank
rather than the braking of the car.
The Honorable Trial Court submitted the question
of the defendant's lookout to the jury. Hindsight, of
course, is a wonderful thing, but we must bear in mind
that as the defendant drove into view .of the Wasatch
School, which was not a designated sleigh riding area,
there was not one child slevgh riding down the school
ground slope, or anywhere else tin the block. The defendant proceeded at a speed of 10 to 12 miles per hour,
a speed which would be safe and cautious, even if we
saddled the defendant with knowledge that the children
had previously been sleighing. There was a three foot
high snow bank between the hill and the road, against
which many of the children previously had stopped,
without entering the street. There were no sleigh tracks
across the street for a motorist to see and be forewarned.
(T-21, Officer Rose) The one spot in the block long snow
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bank through which the plaintiff minor and his friend
Steven Branz, had gone partly over and partly through
the bank (Tr-20) certainly would not be observed and
appreciated by the normal driver as a red flag of danger.
Indeed, it is doubtful that at a distance, it would be
apparent that there was any "cut" in the bank at all.
The plaintiff minor did not testify, although he was
In Court. Steven, Branz, age 12, and therefore, age 8
years at the time of the accident, was the only ·witness
produced by the plaintiff who claimed to be an eye witness. He testified, (Tr-130)
". . . and when we were coming up, I was
ahead of Ralph and we were just about to the top
and he started down and I shouted to him and he
kept going and the car tried to stop and it skidded
and they both met, more or less, as it hit the snow
bank."
Tr132

Q. Steven, where were you standing when you
yelled at Ralph~
A.

About the top of the hill.

Q. About the top of the hill and Ralph was already going do"\vn the hill~
A. Yes.
The Honorable Trial Court, on the above vague
evidence, ruled that there was a question for the jury
as to whether the defendant was negligent for not seeing
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the boy on the sleigh (before the sleigh entered the area
of no visibility below the snow bank), and of course
whether his failure to see the boy was a proximate cause
of the accident. With that decision we need not now
quarrel. But it is crystal clear, that at best, it was a jury
question, upon which the jury has rendered its verdict.
This Court, in Toomer's Estate v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 239 Pac. 2nd, 163 stated:
"A good statement of the proper approach
is made by the Supreme Court of Idaho in Adkins
v. Zalasky, 59 Idaho 292, 81 Pac. 2nd, 1090, 1093,
wherein it was stated: 'One reason for the rule
that the existence of negligence, or contributory
negligence, is not generally a question for th~
judge is that a jury is composed of members of
various ages, occupations and experiences, and
is in a better position to determine what a reasonably prudent person would do, under stated circumstances, than is a trial judge or an appellate
court. . . . It is only when there can be but one
possible answer, reasonably made, to that question, that a trial judge, or an appellate Court
should assume to decide it."
POINT II
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY WERE
NOT ERRONEOUS.

Plaintiff has, in Point II of his Brief, complained of
three Instructions taken verbatim from Jury Instruction
Forms, Utah. Instruction No. 10 is found at 16.10,
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J.I.F.U. under the title "General Rules in Negligence
Actions."

Instruction No. 11, combined 15.6 and 15.7, J.I.F.U.
and Instruction No. 13 incorporates 15.8, J.I.F.U., the
latter three approved instructions being listed under
the title "Basic Negligence Concepts Defined."

Obviously, the Trial Court gave the jury the above
instructions as a foundation for their deliberations. We
believe that the appellant cannot properly complain because the Court defined proximate cause; or explained
the obvious proposition that no one is under the legal
duty to anticipate an emergency until he observes, or
should observe,. something to warn him.

Instructions numbers 11 and 13, contrary to appellant's argument, were actually favorable to the plaintiff.
~here was sufficient evidence before the jury from which

they could have found that the mother of the minor was
negligent, and while this was not a defense set up, the
Court in instruction nuniber 13, and 14 clearly advised
the :jury that if they found the defendant negligent, and
his negligence a proximate cause of the accident, the
plaintiff minor must recover, even if they found his
rp.other, another child, or the plaintiff hin1self also negligent.
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It goes without saying that the Instructions attacked

by the plaintiff have nothing to do, and say nothing,
about the contributory negligence of the plaintiff.

We feel that the Instructions as a whole were proplaintiff, and overemphasized plaintiff's case. Permanent disability and loss of future earnings were submitted
to the jury (number 22) despite the medical testimony
that any such loss was a result of a bicycle accident many
months after the automobile accident. Number 27 advised the jury they could disagree if they could not agree
on the "Matter of damages." The child's contributory
negligence was taken from the jury as a question of fact.
In number 2, the jury was advised in effect, that they
might find the defendant negligent for not sounding his
horn. And in Number 24, the Court advised the jury
that ... "should your determination be that there should
be no damage, then you will entirely disregard the instructions given you upon the matter of damages."

We believe it obvious that the Instructions, from the
plaintiff's standpoint, were exceptionally fair, and that
his contention that they must have been taken to mean
something other than what their clear language expressed, is not a proper reason for attack against them.
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SUMMARY

Plaintiff now contends that the defendant, as a matter of law, was negligent and that his negligence was a
proximate cause of the accident. He made no such contention during the trial, as no Motion for a directed verdict was made by him.

W eJ feel that plaintiff's evidence proved nothing
more than that a very unfortunate accident occurred.
The plaintiff's own witnesses corroborated the defendant's testimony that here was a classic ex~ple of an
unavoidable accident on defendant's part.
The jury has decided the issues of fact, and we feel
Appellant has failed to show any reason why plaintiff
is entitled to subject defendant to the expense and annoyance of a new trial.
Plaintiff received an eminently fair trial. Over defendant's objections, the jury was pennitted to view the
scene four years after the accident, and on a day when no
snow was on the ground, and where no proper foundation
was laid showing the lack of changes in the area (Tr-155
to 165). Over defendant's objections, plaintiff's witnesses
were permitted to give their opinions of the safe speed
a nwtorist should travel on the street ( Tr-13, to 14 and
Tr. 44-45).
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We respectfully submit that the verdict and Judgment should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

LOUIS E. MIDGLEY,
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent.
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